Progress and Poverty
[01] The term rent,
in its economic sense -- that is, when used, as I am using it, to
distinguish that part of the produce which accrues to the owners of
land or other natural capabilities by virtue of their ownership --
differs in meaning from the word rent as commonly used. In some respects
this economic meaning is narrower than the common meaning; in other
respects it is wider.
[02] It is narrower
in this: In common speech, we apply the word rent to payments for
the use of buildings, machinery, fixtures, etc., as well as to payments
for the use of land or other natural capabilities; and in speaking
of the rent of a house or the rent of a farm, we do not separate the
price for the use of the improvements from the price for the use of
the bare land. But in the economic meaning of rent, payments for the
use of any of the products of human exertion are excluded, and of
the lumped payments for the use of houses, farms, etc., only that
part is rent which constitutes the consideration for the use of the
land -- that part paid for the use of buildings or other improvements
being properly interest, as it is a consideration for the use of capital.
[03] It is wider in
this: In common speech we speak of rent only when owner and user are
distinct persons. But in the economic sense there is also rent where
the same person is both owner and user. Where owner and user are thus
the same person, whatever part of his income he might obtain by letting
the land to another is rent, while the return for his labor and capital
are that part of his income which they would yield him did he hire
instead of owning the land. Rent is also expressed in a selling price.
When land is purchased, the payment which is made for the ownership,
or right to perpetual use, is rent commuted or capitalized. If I buy
land for a small price and hold it until I can sell it for a large
price, I have become rich, not by wages for my labor or by interest
upon my capital, but by the increase of rent. Rent, in short, is the
share in the wealth produced which the exclusive right to the use
of natural capabilities gives to the owner. Wherever land has an exchange
value there is rent in the economic meaning of the term. Wherever
land having a value is used, either by owner or hirer there is rent
actual; wherever it is not used, but still has a value, there is rent
potential. It is this capacity of yielding rent which gives value
to land. Until its ownership will confer some advantage, land has
no value.1
[04] Thus rent or land
value does not arise from the productiveness or utility of land. It
in no wise represents any help or advantage given to production, but
simply the power of securing a part of the results of production.
No matter what are its capabilities, land can yield no rent and have
no value until some one is willing to give labor or the results of
labor for the privilege of using it; and what any one will thus give
depends not upon the capacity of the land, but upon its capacity as
compared with that of land that can be had for nothing. I may have
very rich land, but it will yield no rent and have no value so long
as there is other land as good to be had without cost. But when this
other land is appropriated, and the best land to be had for nothing
is inferior, either in fertility, situation, or other quality, my
land will begin to have a value and yield rent. And though the productiveness
of my land may decrease, yet if the productiveness of the land to
be had without charge decreases in greater proportion, the rent I
can get, and consequently the value of my land, will steadily increase.
Rent, in short, is the price of monopoly, arising from the reduction
to individual ownership of natural elements which human exertion can
neither produce nor increase.
[05] If one man owned
all the land accessible to any community, he could, of course, demand
any price or condition for its use that he saw fit; and, as long as
his ownership was acknowledged, the other members of the community
would have but death or emigration as the alternative to submission
to his terms. This has been the case in many communities; but in the
modern form of society, the land, though generally reduced to individual
ownership, is in the hands of too many different persons to permit
the price which can be obtained for its use to be fixed by mere caprice
or desire. While each individual owner tries to get all he can, there
is a limit to what he can get, which constitutes the market price
or market rent of the land, and which varies with different lands
and at different times. The law, or relation, which, under these circumstances
of free competition among all parties (the condition which in tracing
out the principles of political economy is always to be assumed),
determines what rent or price can be got by the owner, is styled the
law of rent. This fixed with certainty, we have more than a starting
point from which the laws which regulate wages and interest may be
traced. For, as the distribution of wealth is a division, in ascertaining
what fixes the share of the produce which goes as rent, we also ascertain
what fixes the share which is left for wages, where there is no co-operation
of capital; and what fixes the joint share left for wages. and interest,
where capital does co-operate in production.
[06] Fortunately, as
to the law of rent there is no necessity for discussion. Authority
here coincides with common sense,2
and the accepted dictum of the current political economy has the self-evident
character of a geometric axiom. This accepted law of rent, which John
Stuart Mill denominates the pons asinorum of political economy,
is sometimes styled "Ricardo's law of rent," from the fact that, although
not the first to announce it, he first brought it prominently into
notice.3 It is:
[07] The rent of
land is determined by the excess of its produce over that which the
same application can secure from the least productive land in use.
[08] This law, which
of course applies to land used for other purposes than agriculture,
and to all natural agencies, such as mines, fisheries, etc., has been
exhaustively explained and illustrated by all the leading economists
since Ricardo. But its mere statement has all the force of a self-evident
proposition, for it is clear that the effect of competition is to
make the lowest reward for which labor and capital will engage in
production, the highest that they can claim; and hence to enable the
owner of more productive land to appropriate in rent all the return
above that required to recompense labor and capital at the ordinary
rate -- that is to say, what they can obtain upon the least productive
land in use, or at the least productive point, where, of course, no
rent is paid.
[09] Perhaps it may
conduce to a fuller understanding of the law of rent to put it in
this form: The ownership of a natural agent of production will give
the power of appropriating so much of the wealth produced by the exertion
of labor and capital upon it as exceeds the return which the same
application of labor and capital could secure in the least productive
occupation in which they freely engage.
[10] This, however,
amounts to precisely the same thing, for there is no occupation in
which labor and capital can engage which does not require the use
of land; and, furthermore, the cultivation or other use of land will
always be carried to as low a point of remuneration, all things considered,
as is freely accepted in any other pursuit. Suppose, for instance,
a community in which part of the labor and capital is devoted to agriculture
and part to manufactures. The poorest land cultivated yields an average
return which we will call 20, and 20 therefore will be the average
return to labor and capital, as well in manufactures as in agriculture.
Suppose that from some permanent cause the return in manufactures
is now reduced to 15. Clearly, the labor and capital engaged in manufactures
will turn to agriculture; and the process will not stop until, either
by the extension of cultivation to inferior lands or to inferior points
on the same land, or by an increase in the relative value of manufactured
products, owing to the diminution of production -- or, as a matter
of fact, by both processes -- the yield to labor and capital in both
pursuits has, all things considered, been brought again to the same
level, so that whatever be the final point of productiveness at which
manufactures are still carried on, whether it be 18 or 17 or 16, cultivation
will also be extended to that point. And, thus, to say that rent will
be the excess in productiveness over the yield at the margin, or lowest
point, of cultivation, is the same thing as to say that it will be
the excess of produce over what the same amount of labor and capital
obtains in the least remunerative occupation.
[11] The law of rent
is, in fact, but a deduction from the law of competition, and amounts
simply to the assertion that as wages and interest tend to a common
level, all that part of the general production of wealth which exceeds
what the labor and capital employed could have secured for themselves,
if applied to the poorest natural agent in use, will go to landowners
in the shape of rent. It rests, in the last analysis, upon the fundamental
principle, which is to political economy what the attraction of gravitation
is to physics -- that men will seek to gratify their desires with
the least exertion.
[12] This, then, is
the law of rent. Although many standard treatises follow too much
the example of Ricardo, who seems to view it merely in its relation
to agriculture, and in several places speaks of manufactures yielding
no rent (when, in truth, manufactures and exchange yield the highest
rents, as is evinced by the greater value of land in manufacturing
and commercial cities), thus hiding the full importance of the law,
yet, ever since the time of Ricardo, the law itself has been clearly
apprehended and fully recognized. But not so its corollaries. Plain
as they are, the accepted doctrine of wages (backed and fortified
not only as has been hitherto explained, but by considerations whose
enormous weight will be seen when the logical conclusion toward which
we are tending is reached) has hitherto prevented their recognition.4
Yet, is it not as plain as the simplest geometrical demonstration,
that the corollary of the law of rent is the law of wages, where the
division of the produce is simply between rent and wages; or the law
of wages and interest taken together, where the division is into rent,
wages, and interest? Stated reversely, the law of rent is necessarily
the law of wages and interest taken together, for it is the assertion,
that no matter what the production which results from the application
of labor and capital, these two factors will receive in wages and
interest only such part of the produce as they could have produced
on land free to them without the payment of rent -- that is, the least
productive land or point in use. For, if, of the produce, all over
the amount which labor and capital could secure from land for which
no rent is paid must go to land owners as rent, then all that can
be claimed by labor and capital as wages and interest is the amount
which they could have secured from land yielding no rent.
[13] Or to put it in
algebraic form:
[14] As Produce = Rent
+ Wages + Interest,
[15] Therefore, Produce
- Rent = Wages + Interest.
[16] Thus wages and
interest do not depend upon the produce of labor and capital, but
upon what is left after rent is taken out; or, upon the produce which
they could obtain without paying rent -- that is, from the poorest
land in use. And hence, no matter what be the increase in productive
power, if the increase in rent keeps pace with it, neither wages nor
interest can increase.
[17] The moment this
simple relation is recognized, a flood of light streams in upon what
was before inexplicable, and seemingly discordant facts range themselves
under an obvious law. The increase of rent which goes on in progressive
countries is at once seen to be the key which explains why wages and
interest fail to increase with increase of productive power. For the
wealth produced in every community is divided into two parts by what
may be called the rent line, which is fixed by the margin of cultivation,
or the return which labor and capital could obtain from such natural
opportunities as are free to them without the payment of rent. From
the part of the produce below this line wages and interest must be
paid. All that is above goes to the owners of land. Thus, where the
value of land is low, there may be a small production of wealth, and
yet a high rate of wages and interest, as we see in new countries.
And, where the value of land is high, there may be a very large production
of wealth, and yet a low rate of wages and interest, as we see in
old countries. And, where productive power increases, as it is increasing
in all progressive countries, wages and interest will be affected,
not by the increase, but by the manner in which rent is affected.
If the value of land increases proportionately, all the increased
production will be swallowed up by rent, and wages and interest will
remain as before. If the value of land increases in greater ratio
than productive power, rent will swallow up even more than the increase;
and while the produce of labor and capital will be much larger, wages
and interest will fall. It is only when the value of land fails to
increase as rapidly as productive power, that wages and interest can
increase with the increase of productive power. All this is exemplified
in actual fact.
Footnotes:
1 In speaking
of the value of land I use and shall use the words as referring
to the value of the bare land. When I wish to speak of the value
of land and improvements I shall use those words.
2 I do not
mean to say that the accepted law of rent has never been disputed.
In all the nonsense that in the present disjointed condition of
the science has been printed as political economy, it would be hard
to find anything that has not been disputed. But I mean to say that
it has the sanction of all economic writers who are really to be
regarded as authority. As John Stuart Mill says (Book Il, Chap.
XVI), "there are few persons who have refused their assent to it,
except from not having thoroughly understood it. The loose and inaccurate
way in which it is often apprehended by those who affect to refute
it is very remarkable." An observation which has received many later
exemplifications.
3 According
to McCulloch the law of rent was first stated in a pamphlet by Dr.
James Anderson of Edinburgh in 1777, and simultaneously in the beginning
of this century by Sir Edward West, Mr. Malthus, and Mr. Ricardo.
4 Buckle (Chap.
11, "History of Civilization") recognizes the necessary relation
between rent, interest, and wages, but evidently never worked it
out.
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