Progress and Poverty
[01] Our long inquiry
is ended. We may now marshal the results.
[02] To begin with the
industrial depressions, to account for which so many contradictory
and self-contradictory theories are broached.
[03] A consideration
of the manner in which the speculative advance in land values cuts
down the earnings of labor and capital and checks production leads,
I think, irresistibly to the conclusion that this is the main cause
of those periodical industrial depressions to which every civilized
country, and all civilized countries together, seem increasingly liable.
[04] I do not mean to
say that there are not other proximate causes. The growing complexity
and interdependence of the machinery of production, which makes each
shock or stoppage propagate itself through a widening circle; the
essential defect of currencies which contract when most needed, and
the tremendous alternations in volume that occur in the simpler forms
of commercial credit, which, to a much greater extent than currency
in any form, constitute the medium or flux of exchanges; the protective
tariffs which present artificial barriers to the interplay of productive
forces, and other similar causes, undoubtedly bear important part
in producing and continuing what are called hard times. But, both
from the consideration of principles and the observation of phenomena,
it is clear that the great initiatory cause is to be looked for in
the speculative advance of land values.
[05] In the preceding
chapter I have shown that the speculative advance in land values tends
to press the margin of cultivation, or production, beyond its normal
limit, thus compelling labor and capital to accept of a smaller return,
or (and this is the only way they can resist the tendency) to cease
production. Now, it is not only natural that labor and capital should
resist the crowding down of wages and interest by the speculative
advance of rent, but they are driven to this in self-defense, inasmuch
as there is a minimum of return below which labor cannot exist nor
capital be maintained. Hence, from the fact of speculation in land,
we may infer all the phenomena which mark these recurring seasons
of industrial depression.
[06] Given a progressive
community, in which population is increasing and one improvement succeeds
another, and land must constantly increase in value. This steady increase
naturally leads to speculation in which future increase is anticipated,
and land values are carried beyond the point at which, under the existing
conditions of production, their accustomed returns would be left to
labor and capital. Production, therefore, begins to stop. Not that
there is necessarily, or even probably, an absolute diminution in
production; but that there is what in a progressive community would
be equivalent to an absolute diminution of production in a stationary
community -- a failure in production to increase proportionately,
owing to the failure of new increments of labor and capital to find
employment at the accustomed rates.
[07] This stoppage of
production at some points must necessarily show itself at other points
of the industrial network, in a cessation of demand, which would again
check production there, and thus the paralysis would communicate itself
through all the interlacings of industry and commerce, producing everywhere
a partial disjointing of production and exchange, and resulting in
the phenomena that seem to show overproduction or overconsumption,
according to the standpoint from which they are viewed.
[08] The period of depression
thus ensuing would continue until (1) the speculative advance in rents
had been lost; or (2) the increase in the efficiency of labor, owing
to the growth of population and the progress of improvement, had enabled
the normal rent line to overtake the speculative rent line; or (3)
labor and capital had become reconciled to engaging in production
for smaller returns. Or, most probably, all three of these causes
would co-operate to produce a new equilibrium, at which all the forces
of production would again engage, and a season of activity ensue;
whereupon rent would begin to advance again, a speculative advance
again take place, production again be checked, and the same round
be gone over.
[09] In the elaborate
and complicated system of production which is characteristic of modern
civilization, where, moreover, there is no such thing as a distinct
and independent industrial community, but geographically or politically
separated communities blend and interlace their industrial organizations
in different modes and varying measures, it is not to be expected
that effect should be seen to follow cause as clearly and definitely
as would be the case in a simpler development of industry, and in
a community forming a complete and distinct industrial whole; but,
nevertheless, the phenomena actually presented by these alternate
seasons of activity and depression clearly correspond with those we
have inferred from the speculative advance of rent.
[10] Deduction thus
shows the actual phenomena as resulting from the principle. If we
reverse the process, it is as easy by induction to reach the principle
by tracing up the phenomena.
[11] These seasons of
depression are always preceded by seasons of activity and speculation,
and on all hands the connection between the two is admitted -- the
depression being looked upon as the reaction from the speculation,
as the headache of the morning is the reaction from the debauch of
the night. But as to the manner in which the depression results from
the speculation, there are two classes or schools of opinion, as the
attempts made on both sides of the Atlantic to account for the present
industrial depression will show.
[12] One school says
that the speculation produced the depression by causing overproduction,
and points to the warehouses filled with goods that cannot be sold
at remunerative prices, to mills closed or working on half time, to
mines shut down and steamers laid up, to money lying idly in bank
vaults, and workmen compelled to idleness and privation. They point
to these facts as showing that the production has exceeded the demand
for consumption, and they point, moreover, to the fact that when government
during war enters the field as an enormous consumer, brisk times prevail,
as in the United States during the civil war and in England during
the Napoleonic struggle.
[13] The other school
says that the speculation has produced the depression by leading to
overconsumption, and points to full warehouses, rusting steamers,
closed mills, and idle workmen as evidences of a cessation of effective
demand, which, they say, evidently results from the fact that people,
made extravagant by a fictitious prosperity, have lived beyond their
means, and are now obliged to retrench -- that is, to consume less
wealth. They point, moreover, to the enormous consumption of wealth
by wars, by the building of unremunerative railroads, by loans to
bankrupt governments, etc., as extravagances which, though not felt
at the time, just as the spendthrift does not at the moment feel the
impairment of his fortune, must now be made up by a season of reduced
consumption.
[14] Now, each of these
theories evidently expresses one side or phase of a general truth,
but each of them evidently fails to comprehend the full truth. As
an explanation of the phenomena, each is equally and utterly preposterous.
[15] For while the great
masses of men want more wealth than they can get, and while they are
willing to give for it that which is the basis and raw material of
wealth -- their labor -- how can there be overproduction? And while
the machinery of production wastes and producers are condemned to
unwilling idleness, how can there be overconsumption?
[16] When, with the
desire to consume more, there coexist the ability and willingness
to produce more, industrial and commercial paralysis cannot be charged
either to overproduction or to overconsumption. Manifestly, the trouble
is that production and consumption cannot meet and satisfy each other.
[17] How does this inability
arise? It is evidently and by common consent the result of speculation.
But of speculation in what?
[18] Certainly not of
speculation in things which are the products of labor -- in agricultural
or mineral productions, or manufactured goods, for the effect of speculation
in such things, as is well shown in current treatises that spare me
the necessity of illustration, is simply to equalize supply and demand,
and to steady the interplay of production and consumption by an action
analogous to that of a flywheel in a machine.
[19] Therefore, if speculation
be the cause of these industrial depressions, it must be speculation
in things not the production of labor, but yet necessary to the exertion
of labor in the production of wealth -- of things of fixed quantity;
that is to say, it must be speculation in land.
[20] That land speculation
is the true cause of industrial depression is, in the United States,
clearly evident. In each period of industrial activity land values
have steadily risen, culminating in speculation which carried them
up in great jumps. This has been invariably followed by a partial
cessation of production, and its correlative, a cessation of effective
demand (dull trade), generally accompanied by a commercial crash;
and then has succeeded a period of comparative stagnation, during
which the equilibrium has been again slowly established, and the same
round been run again. This relation is observable throughout the civilized
world. Periods of industrial activity always culminate in a speculative
advance of land values, followed by symptoms of checked production,
generally shown at first by cessation of demand from the newer countries,
where the advance in land values has been greatest.
[21] That this must
be the main explanation of these periods of depression, will be seen
by an analysis of the facts.
[22] All trade, let
it be remembered, is the exchange of commodities for commodities,
and hence the cessation of demand for some commodities, which marks
the depression of trade, is really a cessation in the supply of other
commodities. That dealers find their sales declining and manufacturers
find orders falling off, while the things which they have to sell,
or stand ready to make, are things for which there is yet a widespread
desire, simply shows that the supply of other things, which in the
course of trade would be given for them, has declined. In common parlance
we say that "buyers have no money," or that "money is becoming scarce,"
but in talking in this way we ignore the fact that money is but the
medium of exchange. What the would-be buyers really lack is not money,
but commodities which they can turn into money -- what is really becoming
scarcer is produce of some sort. The diminution of the effective demand
of consumers is therefore but a result of the diminution of production.
[23] This is seen very
clearly by storekeepers in a manufacturing town when the mills are
shut down and operatives thrown out of work. It is the cessation of
production which deprives the operatives of means to make the purchases
they desire, and thus leaves the storekeeper with what, in view of
the lessened demand, is a superabundant stock, and forces him to discharge
some of his clerks and otherwise reduce his demands. And the cessation
of demand (I am speaking, of course, of general cases and not of any
alteration in relative demand from such causes as change of fashion),
which has left the manufacturer with superabundant stock and compelled
him to discharge his hands, must arise in the same way. Somewhere,
it may be at the other end of the world, a check in production has
produced a check in the demand for consumption. That demand is lessened
without want being satisfied, shows that production is somewhere checked.
[24] People want the
things the manufacturer makes as much as ever, just as the operatives
want the things the storekeeper has to sell. But they do not have
as much to give for them. Production has somewhere been checked, and
this reduction in the supply of some things has shown itself in cessation
of demand for others, the check propagating itself through the whole
framework of industry and exchange. Now, the industrial pyramid manifestly
rests on the land. The primary and fundamental occupations, which
create a demand for all others, are evidently those which extract
wealth from nature, and, hence, if we trace from one exchange point
to another, and from one occupation to another, this check to production,
which shows itself in decreased purchasing power, we must ultimately
find it in some obstacle which checks labor in expending itself on
land. And that obstacle, it is clear, is the speculative advance in
rent, or the value of land, which produces the same effects as (in
fact, it is) a lockout of labor and capital by landowners. This check
to production, beginning at the basis of interlaced industry, propagates
itself from exchange point to exchange point, cessation of supply
becoming failure of demand, until, so to speak, the whole machine
is thrown out of gear, and the spectacle is everywhere presented of
labor going to waste while laborers suffer from want.
[25] This strange and
unnatural spectacle of large numbers of willing men who cannot find
employment is enough to suggest the true cause to whosoever can think
consecutively. For, though custom has dulled us to it, it is a strange
and unnatural thing that men who wish to labor, in order to satisfy
their wants, cannot find the opportunity -- as, since labor is that
which produces wealth, the man who seeks to exchange labor for food,
clothing, or any other form of wealth, is like one who proposes to
give bullion for coin, or wheat for flour. We talk about the supply
of labor and the demand for labor, but, evidently, these are only
relative terms. The supply of labor is everywhere the same -- two
hands always come into the world with one mouth, twenty-one boys to
every twenty girls; and the demand for labor must always exist as
long as men want things which labor alone can procure. We talk about
the "want of work," but, evidently, it is not work that is short while
want continues; evidently, the supply of labor cannot be too great,
nor the demand for labor too small, when people suffer for the lack
of things that labor produces. The real trouble must be that supply
is somehow prevented from satisfying demand, that somewhere there
is an obstacle which prevents labor from producing the things that
laborers want.
[26] Take the case of
any one of these vast masses of unemployed men, to whom, though he
never heard of Malthus, it today seems that there are too many people
in the world. In his own wants, in the needs of his anxious wife,
in the demands of his half-cared-for, perhaps even hungry and shivering
children, there is demand enough for labor, Heaven knows! In his own
willing bands is the supply. Put him on a solitary island, and though
cut off from all the enormous advantages which the co-operation, combination,
and machinery of a civilized community give to the productive powers
of man yet his two hands can fill the mouths and keep warm the backs
that depend upon them. Yet where productive power is at its highest
development they cannot. Why? Is it not because in the one case he
has access to the material and forces of nature, and in the other
this access is denied?
[27] Is it not the fact
that labor is thus shut off from nature which can alone explain the
state of things that compels men to stand idle who would willingly
supply their wants by their labor? The proximate cause of enforced
idleness with one set of men may be the cessation of demand on the
part of other men for the particular things they produce, but trace
this cause from point to point, from occupation to occupation, and
you will find that enforced idleness in one trade is caused by enforced
idleness in another, and that the paralysis which produces dullness
in all trades cannot be said to spring from too great a supply of
labor or too small a demand for labor, but must proceed from the fact
that supply cannot meet demand by producing the things which satisfy
want and are the object of labor.
[28] Now, what is necessary
to enable labor to produce these things, is land. When we speak of
labor creating wealth, we speak metaphorically. Man creates nothing.
The whole human race, were they to labor forever, could not create
the tiniest mote that floats in a sunbeam could not make this rolling
sphere one atom heavier or one atom lighter. In producing wealth,
labor, with the aid of natural forces, but works up, into the forms
desired, pre-existing matter, and, to produce wealth, must, therefore,
have access to this matter and to these forces -- that is to say,
to land. The land is the source of all wealth. It is the mine from
which must be drawn the ore that labor fashions. It is the substance
to which labor gives the form. And, hence, when labor cannot satisfy
its wants, may we not with certainty infer that it can be from no
other cause than that labor is denied access to land?
[29] When in all trades
there is what we call scarcity of employment; when, everywhere, labor
wastes, while desire is unsatisfied, must not the obstacle which prevents
labor from producing the wealth it needs, lie at the foundation of
the industrial structure? That foundation is land. Milliners, optical
instrument makers, gilders, and polishers, are not the pioneers of
new settlements. Miners did not go to California or Australia because
shoemakers, tailors, machinists, and printers were there. But those
trades followed the miners, just as they are now following the gold
diggers into the Black Hills and the diamond diggers into South Africa.
It is not the storekeeper who is the cause of the farmer, but the
farmer who brings the storekeeper. It is not the growth of the city
that develops the country, but the development of the country that
makes the city grow. And, hence, when, through all trades, men willing
to work cannot find opportunity to do so, the difficulty must arise
in the employment that creates a demand for all other employments
-- it must be because labor is shut out from land.
[30] In Leeds or Lowell,
in Philadelphia or Manchester, in London or New York, it may require
a grasp of first principles to see this; but where industrial development
has not become so elaborate, nor the extreme links of the chain so
widely separated, one has but to look at obvious facts. Although not
yet thirty years old, the city of San Francisco, both in population
and in commercial importance, ranks among the great cities of the
world, and, next to New York, is the most metropolitan of American
cities. Though not yet thirty years old, she has had for some years
an increasing number of unemployed men. Clearly, here, it is because
men cannot find employment in the country that there are so many unemployed
in the city; for when the harvest opens they go trooping out, and
when it is over they come trooping back to the city again. If these
now unemployed men were producing wealth from the land, they would
not only be employing themselves, but would be employing all the mechanics
of the city, giving custom to the storekeepers, trade to the merchants,
audiences to the theaters, and subscribers and advertisements to the
newspapers -- creating effective demand that would be felt in New
England and Old England, and wherever throughout the world come the
articles that, when they have the means to pay for them, such a population
consumes.
[31] Now, why is it
that this unemployed labor cannot employ itself upon the land? Not
that the land is all in use. Though all the symptoms that in older
countries are taken as showing a redundancy of population are beginning
to manifest themselves in San Francisco, it is idle to talk of redundancy
of population in a State that with greater natural resources than
France has not yet a million of people. Within a few miles of San
Francisco is unused land enough to give employment to every man who
wants it. I do not mean to say that every unemployed man could turn
farmer or build himself a house, if he had the land; but that enough
could and would do so to give employment to the rest. What is it,
then, that prevents labor from employing itself on this land? Simply,
that it has been monopolized and is held at speculative prices, based
not upon present value, but upon the added value that will come with
the future growth of population.
[32] What may thus be
seen in San Francisco by whoever is willing to see, may, I doubt not,
be seen as clearly in other places.
[33] The present commercial
and industrial depression, which first clearly manifested itself in
the United States in 1872, and has spread with greater or less intensity
over the civilized world, is largely attributed to the undue extension
of the railroad system, with which there are many things that seem
to show its relation. I am fully conscious that the construction of
railroads before they are actually needed may divert capital and labor
from more to less productive employments, and make a community poorer
instead of richer; and when the railroad mania was at its highest,
I pointed this out in a political tract addressed to the people of
California;1 but
to assign to this wasting of capital such a widespread industrial
deadlock seems to me like attributing an unusually low tide to the
drawing of a few extra bucketfuls of water. The waste of capital and
labor during the civil war was enormously greater than it could possibly
be by the construction of unnecessary railroads, but without producing
any such result. And, certainly, there seems to be little sense in
talking of the waste of capital and labor in railroads as causing
this depression, when the prominent feature of the depression has
been the superabundance of capital and labor seeking employment.
[34] Yet, that there
is a connection between the rapid construction of railroads and industrial
depression, any one who understands what increased land values mean,
and who has noticed the effect which the construction of railroads
has upon land speculation, can easily see. Wherever a railroad was
built or projected, lands sprang up in value under the influence of
speculation, and thousands of millions of dollars were added to the
nominal values which capital and labor were asked to pay outright,
or to pay in installments, as the price of being allowed to go to
work and produce wealth. The inevitable result was to check production,
and this check to production propagated itself in a cessation of demand,
which checked production to the furthest verge of the wide circle
of exchanges, operating with accumulated force in the centers of the
great industrial commonwealth into which commerce links the civilized
world.
[35] The primary operations
of this cause can, perhaps, be nowhere more clearly traced than in
California, which, from its comparative isolation, has constituted
a peculiarly well-defined community.
[36] Until almost its
close, the last decade was marked in California by the same industrial
activity which was shown in the Northern States, and, in fact, throughout
the civilized world, when the interruption of exchanges and the disarrangement
of industry caused by the war and the blockade of southern ports is
considered. This activity could not be attributed to inflation of
the currency or to lavish expenditures of the General Government,
to which in the eastern states the comparative activity of the same
period has since been attributed; for, in spite of legal tender laws,
the Pacific Coast adhered to a coin currency, and the taxation of
the Federal Government took away very much more than was returned
in Federal expenditures. It was attributable solely to normal causes,
for, though placer mining was declining, the Nevada silver mines were
being opened, wheat and wool were beginning to take the place of gold
in the table of exports, and an increasing population and the improvement
in the methods of production and exchange were steadily adding to
the efficiency of labor.
[37] With this material
progress went on a steady enhancement in land values -- its consequence.
This steady advance engendered a speculative advance, which, with
the railroad era, ran up land values in every direction. If the population
of California had steadily grown when the long, costly, fever-haunted
Isthmus route was the principal mode of communication with the Atlantic
States, it must, it was thought, increase enormously with the opening
of a road which would bring New York Harbor and San Francisco Bay
within seven days' easy travel, and when in the state itself the locomotive
took the place of stage coach and freight wagon. The expected increase
of land values which would thus accrue was discounted in advance.
Lots on the outskirts of San Francisco rose hundreds and thousands
per cent., and farming land was taken up and held for high prices,
in whichever direction an immigrant was likely to go.
[38] But the anticipated
rush of immigrants did not take place. Labor and capital could not
pay so much for land and make fair returns. Production was checked,
if not absolutely, at least relatively. As the transcontinental railroad
approached completion, instead of increased activity, symptoms of
depression began to manifest themselves; and, when it was completed,
to the season of activity had succeeded a period of depression which
has not since been fully recovered from, during which wages and interest
have steadily fallen. What I have called the actual rent line, or
margin of cultivation, is thus (as well as by the steady march of
improvement and increase of population, which, though slower than
it otherwise would have been, still goes on) approaching the speculative
rent line, but the tenacity with which a speculative advance in the
price of land is maintained in a developing community is well known.2
[39] Now, what thus
went on in California went on in every progressive section of the
Union. Everywhere that a railroad was built or projected, land was
monopolized in anticipation, and the benefit of the improvement was
discounted in increased land values. The speculative advance in rent
thus outrunning the normal advance, production was checked, demand
was decreased, and labor and capital were turned back from occupations
more directly concerned with land, to glut those in which the value
of land is a less perceptible element. It is thus that the rapid extension
of railroads is related to the succeeding depression.
[40] And what went on
in the United States went on in a greater or less obvious degree all
over the progressive world. Everywhere land values have been steadily
increasing with material progress, and everywhere this increase begot
a speculative advance. The impulse of the primary cause not only radiated
from the newer sections of the Union to the older sections, and from
the United States to Europe, but everywhere the primary cause was
acting. And, hence, a world-wide depression of industry and commerce,
begotten of a world-wide material progress.
[41] There is one thing
which, it may seem, I have overlooked, in attributing these industrial
depressions to the speculative advance of rent or land values as a
main and primary cause. The operation of such a cause, though it may
be rapid, must be progressive -- resembling a pressure, not a blow.
But these industrial depressions seem to come suddenly -- they have,
at their beginning, the character of a paroxysm, followed by a comparative
lethargy, as if of exhaustion. Everything seems to be going on as
usual, commerce and industry vigorous and expanding, When suddenly
there comes a shock, as of a thunderbolt out of a clear sky -- a bank
breaks, a great manufacturer or merchant falls, and, as if a blow
had thrilled through the entire industrial organization, failure succeeds
failure, and on every side workmen are discharged from employment,
and capital shrinks into profitless security.
[42] Let me explain
what I think to be the reason of this: To do so, we must take into
account the manner in which exchanges are made, for it is by exchanges
that all the varied forms of industry are linked together into one
mutually related and interdependent organization. To enable exchanges
to be made between producers far removed by space and time, large
stocks must be kept in store and in transit, and this, as I have already
explained, I take to be the great function of capital, in addition
to that of supplying tools and seed. These exchanges are, perhaps
necessarily, largely made upon credit -- that is to say, the advance
upon one side is made before the return is received on the other.
[43] Now, without stopping
to inquire as to the causes, it is manifest that these advances are,
as a rule, from the more highly organized and later developed industries
to the more fundamental. The West Coast African, for instance, who
exchanges palm oil and cocoanuts for gaudy calico and Birmingham idols,
gets his return immediately; the English merchant, on the contrary,
has to lay out of his goods a long while before he gets his returns.
The farmer can sell his crop as soon as it is harvested, and for cash;
the great manufacturer must keep a large stock, send his goods long
distances to agents, and, generally, sell on time. Thus, as advances
and credits are generally from what we may call the secondary, to
what we may call the primary industries, it follows that any check
to production which proceeds from the latter will not immediately
manifest itself in the former. The system of advances and credits
constitutes, as it were, an elastic connection, which will give considerably
before breaking, but which, when it breaks, will break with a snap.
[44] Or, to illustrate
in another way what I mean: The great pyramid of Gizeh is composed
of layers of masonry, the bottom layer, of course, supporting all
the rest. Could we by some means gradually contract this bottom layer,
the upper part of the pyramid would for some time retain its form,
and then, when gravitation at length overcame the adhesiveness of
the material, would not diminish gradually and regularly, but would
break off suddenly, in large pieces. Now, the industrial organization
may be likened to such a pyramid. What is the proportion which in
a given stage of social development the various industries bear to
each other, it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to say; but it
is obvious that there is such a proportion, just as in a printer's
font of type there is a certain proportion between the various letters.
Each form of industry, as it is developed by division of labor, springs
from and rises out of the others, and all rest ultimately upon land;
for, without land, labor is as impotent as would be a man in void
space. To make the illustration closer to the condition of a progressive
country, imagine a pyramid composed of superimposed layers -- the
whole constantly growing and expanding. Imagine the growth of the
layer nearest the ground to be checked. The others will for a time
keep on expanding -- in fact, for the moment, the tendency will be
to quicker expansion, for the vital force which is refused scope on
the ground layer will strive to find vent in those above -- until,
at length, there is a decided overbalance and a sudden crumbling along
all the faces of the pyramid.
[45] That the main cause
and general course of the recurring paroxysms of industrial depression,
which are becoming so marked a feature of modern social life, are
thus explained, is, I think, clear. And let the reader remember that
it is only the main causes and general courses of such phenomena that
we are seeking to trace or that, in fact, it is possible to trace
with any exactness. Political economy can deal, and has need to deal,
only with general tendencies. The derivative forces are so multiform,
the actions and reactions are so various, that the exact character
of the phenomena cannot be predicted. We know that if a tree is cut
through it will fall, but precisely in what direction will be determined
by the inclination of the trunk, the spread of the branches, the impact
of the blows, the quarter and force of the wind; and even a bird lighting
on a twig, or a frightened squirrel leaping from bough to bough, will
not be without its influence. We know that an insult will arouse a
feeling of resentment in the human breast, but to say how far and
in what way it will manifest itself, would require a synthesis which
would build up the entire man and all his surroundings, past and present.
[46] The manner in which
the sufficient cause to which I have traced them explains the main
features of these industrial depressions is in striking contrast with
the contradictory and self-contradictory attempts which have been
made to explain them on the current theories of the distribution of
wealth. That a speculative advance in rent or land values invariably
precedes each of these seasons of industrial depression is everywhere
clear. That they bear to each other the relations of cause and effect,
is obvious to whosoever considers the necessary relations between
land and labor.
[47] And that the present
depression is running its course, and that, in the manner previously
indicated, a new equilibrium is being established, which will result
in another season of comparative activity, may already be seen in
the United States. The normal rent line and the speculative rent line
are being brought together: (1) By the fall in speculative land values,
which is very evident in the reduction of rents and shrinkage of real
estate values in the principal cities. (2) By the increased efficiency
of labor, arising from the growth of population and the utilization
of new inventions and discoveries, some of which almost as important
as that of the use of steam we seem to be on the verge of grasping.
(3) By the lowering of the habitual standard of interest and wages,
which, as to interest, is shown by the negotiation of a government
loan at four per cent., and as to wages is too generally evident for
any special citation. When the equilibrium is thus re-established,
a season of renewed activity, culminating in a speculative advance
of land values, will set in.3
But wages and interest will not recover their lost ground. The net
result of all these perturbations or wave-like movements is the gradual
forcing of wages and interest toward their minimum. These temporary
and recurring depressions exhibit, in fact, as was noticed in the
opening chapter, but intensifications of the general movement which
accompanies material progress.
Footnotes:
1 "The Subsidy
Question and the Democratic Party," 1871
2 It is astonishing
how in a new country of great expectations speculative prices of
land will be kept up. It is common to hear the expression, "There
is no market for real estate; you cannot sell it at any price,"
and yet, at the same time, if you go to buy it, unless you find
somebody who is absolutely compelled to sell, you must pay the prices
that prevailed when speculation ran high. For owners, believing
that land values must ultimately advance, hold on as long as they
can.
3 This was
written a year ago. It is now (July, 1879) evident that a new period
of activity has commenced, as above predicted, and in New York and
Chicago real estate prices have already begun to recover.
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